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Abstract
In recent years, significant advances have been made in understanding the adaptive (ultimate) and mechanistic (proximate)
explanations for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation. Studies of cooperative behaviour in humans invariably use
economic games. These games have provided important insights into the mechanisms that maintain economic and social
cooperation in our species. However, they usually rely on the division of monetary tokens which are given to participants by
the investigator. The extent to which behaviour in such games may reflect behaviour in the real world of biological markets
– where money must be earned and behavioural strategies incur real costs and benefits – is unclear. To provide new data on
the potential scale of this problem, we investigated whether people behaved differently in two standard economic games
(public goods game and dictator game) when they had to earn their monetary endowments through the completion of dull
or physically demanding tasks, as compared with simply being given the endowment. The requirement for endowments to
be ‘earned’ through labour did not affect behaviour in the dictator game. However, the requirement to complete a dull task
reduced cooperation in the public goods game among the subset of participants who were not familiar with game theory.
There has been some effort to test whether the conclusions drawn from standard, token-based cooperation games
adequately reflect cooperative behaviour ‘in the wild.’ However, given the almost total reliance on such games to study
cooperation, more exploration of this issue would be welcome. Our data are not unduly worrying, but they do suggest that
further exploration is needed if we are to make general inferences about human behaviour from the results of structured
economic games.
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Introduction
Cooperation – where one individual’s actions increase the
fitness of another – can be favoured by natural selection for two
reasons. First, cooperation can increase the actor’s reproductive
success (i.e. cooperation confers direct fitness benefits); second, the
actor can direct cooperation at individuals who also carry the
cooperative gene (i.e. cooperation confers indirect fitness benefits)
[1,2]. Evolutionary explanations for cooperation, and the effects of
environment and population structure on selection for coopera-
tion, are well understood (reviewed by [1,3–5]). Our own species
also possesses a variety of behavioural adaptations that promote
apparently selfless behaviour. These ‘proximate’ explanations
(sensu [6,7]; see also [8]) of sociality include a tendency toward
direct (e.g. [9]) and indirect [10,11] reciprocity and the
punishment of defectors (e.g. [12,13]). The neurological basis for
cooperation has also received attention (e.g. [14–18]). This work
helps to explain why, when people play anonymous one-shot
economic games, they cooperate more than would be expected if
they were purely self-interested [19–21].
The most common way to investigate our propensity to
cooperate, reciprocate or punish is to use economic games
([8,9,20–23] and discussed by [24]). In these experiments,
participants are given monetary tokens to invest in public goods
or to divide with a partner in ultimatum, trust or dictator games.
These tokens are later converted into real earnings. Such
economic games provide important insights into the roles of
reciprocity [9,10], reputation [10,25], punishment [12,13],
between-group competition [26,27], negotiation [28] and fairness
norms [29] in maintaining cooperation. Experiments have also
demonstrated individual [18,30], cultural [31–33] and sex-based
[34] differences in cooperative strategies.
However, the extent to which these token-based games reflect
behaviour outside the laboratory is not clear (for discussion of this
issue, see [24,35–38]). On a simple level, Benz & Meier [39] report
that individuals make similar decisions about charitable giving
both in the lab and in a natural setting. A larger study of Ethiopian
forest user groups by Rustagi et al. [40] reports a correlation
between the number of conditional cooperators as identified in a
lab game and the success of that group in managing the real-world
public good. Consistent with this, Fehr & Liebbrandt’s study of
Brazilian fishermen [41] showed that individuals who contribute
more to the public good in a lab game use nets with larger holes,
which presumably allow more immature fish to escape and breed,
maintaining the real-world public good on which the participants’
livelihoods depend (see also [42]). In contrast, Lamba’s [43] study
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goods game did not predict whether or not they would exploit a
real, valuable public good. In this study, play in a standard,
structured economic game did not predict how selfishly people
behaved in the ‘real world’.
In the real world of economic and biological markets,
behavioural strategies incur real costs and benefits, in terms of
effort, money, status, time, personal risk and, ultimately,
Darwinian fitness. Clearly one cannot ask experimental partici-
pants to take personal risks or to incur fitness losses, but it is
possible to ask participants to use their own money in games or to
make participants ‘work’ for their endowment. A recent
experiment [44] concluded that mean contributions to a public
goods game were not affected when participants had to provide
their own endowments; however, a re-analysis [45] disputed this
conclusion and revealed that the proportion of ‘free riders’ –
participants who contributed nothing to the public good – was
actually higher among participants who used their own money to
play the game. Various authors have studied how behaviour in
standard games changes when the endowment level is dependent
upon a person’s performance in a task (usually a quiz [46])
compared with when endowments are randomly allocated. The
results are varied. A recent meta-analysis concluded that, on
average, participants in dictator games gave less when they had
earned their endowment [21]; however, Vilares et al. [47] showed
there was no difference in behaviour in trust games when
endowments were either supplied gratis or earned via a
physically-demanding task. Aside from quizzes, we are aware of
only three experiments that imposed tangible costs whilst
specifically looking at variables that are predicted to affect a
person’s willingness to invest effort to benefit others. Heyman and
Ariely [48] used effort in a computer-based task to study the effect
of reward magnitude on investment and Madsen et al. [49] and
Harrison et al. [50] used a physically-demanding exercise to
investigate the effect of genealogical relatedness and social
proximity, respectively.
Given that these results are so varied, more work to explicitly
test how earning endowments affects behaviour in standard
economic games is needed. Here, we test how working to earn
endowments affects behaviour in a highly structured economic
game (the public goods game, PGG) and in a much simpler
measure of pro-social tendency (donation to a charity in a dictator
game, DG). We compared two qualitatively different tasks in our
‘earning’ condition: a time-consuming task, and a physically-
demanding task. In the DG we also allocated heterogeneous
endowments according to success in the task to test for any effect of
endowment size on the amount donated: not only do people earn
their resources in real life, but their earnings depend on their
success and/or how hard they work [46]. In addition, we
examined whether prior knowledge of game theory might
moderate the effect of earning endowments: other authors (e.g.
[51]) have shown that knowledge affects behaviour in standard
games.
Participants in our experiment played either a DG or a PGG. In
both cases, they were assigned to one of three treatments:
monetary endowments were either given to the participant (M
condition) or had to be earned via completion of a dull (T1) or
physically demanding (T2) task. The dull task required partici-
pants to put pipette tips into boxes and the physically demanding
task required them to squat in an isometric ski training exercise
(after [49] and [50]). The DG was a one-shot game in which
participants were randomly assigned to the M1, T1 and T2
conditions and told they would be given or made to earn their
endowment accordingly and then have the option of donating as
much or as little of the endowment as they wanted to a well-known
UK charity. In the PGG, participants played five rounds of the
game anonymously in groups of three. Groups were randomly
assigned to the M, T1 or T2 conditions. In rounds 1, 2, 4 and 5
participants in all conditions were simply given the endowment.
The nature of round 3 differed between experimental conditions:
in the M condition the endowment was provided gratis as in the
other rounds, but in the T1 and T2 conditions endowments in
round 3 had to be earned by completing the tasks described above.
Embedding the T1 and T2 conditions in a sequence of M rounds
allowed us to a) test for any pre-treatment differences between
participants in the three conditions and correct for them if
necessary; b) test for between-subjects differences in behaviour
across the three conditions; and c) test for any ‘carry-over’ effects
of working for endowments when participants returned to being
provided with endowments in rounds 4 and 5. Because we wanted
to compare levels of cooperation between our treatment groups,
we imposed a game structure that, on the whole, favours
cooperation. Otherwise, differences between conditions may be
obscured by a general decay of cooperation towards a selfish
optimum. We achieved this by introducing an element of between-
group competition, a structure known to favour cooperation
[1,26,27,52] – participants were told that if they were in one of the
three groups that earned the highest total amount of money, they
would each be awarded a voucher for a major online retailer.
Results
1. Task validation and dictator game
90 participants took part in the DG, 30 being assigned to each
of the three treatments. We used questionnaires during the DG to
ascertain that the tasks we used were perceived differently from
one another, and from the M condition. Approximately one-third
of participants felt that they owned the money they had been
given, and this did not vary across treatments (10/30 for M, 12/30
for T1 and T2: x
2
2=0.378, p=0.828). None of the participants in
the M condition felt that they had earned their endowment, while
19/30 and 17/30 participants in the T1 and T2 conditions
respectively felt it had been earned. The proportion of participants
who felt they had earned their money was not significantly
different between the two task treatments (x
2
1=0.28, p=0.598).
Participants were more likely to consider the pipette task dull, as
compared with the squatting task (20/30 vs. 10/30 participants in
the two conditions said they found the task dull: x
2
1=6.67,
p=0.010). The squatting task was more likely than the pipette tip




We tested whether the proportion of endowment donated by
each participant was affected by sex, age, knowledge of game
theory, treatment and endowment size using a logit transformed
GLM. The best model, as defined using Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AICc: [53]) included only the main effects of these
terms. The proportion of endowment donated did not differ
between treatments (F2,15=0.02, p=0.977, Figure 1), but there
was a slight negative correlation between endowment size and
proportion donated (F1,58=6.66; p=0.012, partial g
2=0.103).
This is likely due to the very small and potentially ‘throwaway’
amounts of money used at the lower end of our scale. There was
no effect of sex (F1,58=0.48; p=0.490), age (F1,58=0.38;
p=0.542) or knowledge of game theory (F1,58=0.20; p=0.660).
2. Public goods game
72 participants took part in the PGG, 24 being assigned to each
of the three conditions. The raw data are plotted in Figure 2. We
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with the existing literature on PGGs. In round 1, participants
invested an average of 62.562.24% of their endowment. GLMM
showed that the trend in investment over the five rounds was best
described by a linear function, with investment showing a shallow
decline over time (F1,72=5.82, p=0.018; slope = -3.161.28;
partial g
2=0.075). This is broadly consistent with results reported
by other authors [20,54–57]. The slope differed significantly
between individual participants (F16,72=3.05, p=0.001). We
calculated the fitted slopes for each individual participant from
this model and used GLMM to test for significant effects of sex,
age and knowledge of game theory on the slope. No such effects
were found (p $ 0.105).
We then verified that there was no effect of condition on
investment in rounds 1 and 2, when participants in all three
conditions played the same game. Neither condition nor round
were significant as main effects (F2,21=2.96, p=0.245 and
F1,69=0.27, p=0.602, respectively) and neither was their
interaction (F2,69=1.71, p=0.188).
Having thus satisfied ourselves that there were no pre-treatment
differences between our experimental groups, we analysed
investment behaviour in round 3, when conditions actually varied.
We were interested in potential effects of condition, sex, age,
knowledge of game theory and interactions between these
variables. The best model, as defined using Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AICc: [53]), is shown in Table 1. There was no main
effect of condition (F2,65=2.82, p=0.067), which is not consistent
with our main hypothesis that earning investments alters
behaviour. However, there was a significant condition x game
theory interaction (F2,65=3.83, p=0.007). As illustrated in
Figure 3a, this was driven by a difference between the two task
conditions among participants who were not familiar with game
theory: in this subset of participants, investment following the dull,
pipette tip task (T1) was lower than investment following the
physical task (T2; Tukey post-hoc comparison, p=0.049). Further,
investment following T1 was lower among participants who were
unfamiliar with game theory as compared with those who were
familiar with game theory (Tukey post-hoc comparison, p=0.003).
There was also a significant effect of sex, such that women gave
slightly more to the public good than men (F2,65=8.44, p=0.005).
We then sought to determine whether condition influenced
behaviour in the two rounds after the treatment round, where
participants in all conditions once again played the M game.
Again, there was no main effect of condition (F2,136=1.58,
p=0.211), knowledge of game theory (F1,136=1.47, p=0.228) or
round (F1,136=2.59, p=0.110) but there was a significant
condition x game theory interaction (F2,136=3.93, p=0.022). As
illustrated in Figure 3b this interaction was due to a difference
between investment following T2 when comparing participants
who were familiar or unfamiliar with game theory (Tukey post-hoc
comparison, p=0.046); post-hoc comparisons between conditions
within each subset of participants were not significant (p.0.3).
Therefore the divergent reaction to T1 and T2 among participants
unfamiliar with game theory disappeared in rounds 4 and 5.
Discussion
The tasks we used appear well suited for experimental use: they
were easy to implement and were viewed differently by
participants. We found no effect of performing either task to earn
endowments on behaviour in the DG. However, we found that
people who completed the dull task and were unfamiliar with
game theory cooperated less than the control and difficult task
groups in the public goods game. Our results do not undermine
the standard uses of cooperation games. We did not find any
Figure 2. Investment in the public goods game. Raw data (means
6 standard error) of investment by participants in the three treatment
conditions in rounds 1-5 of the game.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027623.g002
Figure 1. Proportion of endowment donated to Oxfam in the
dictator game. Black bars show participants who were given money
(M), grey bars participants who performed the pipette tip task (T1) and
white bars participants who performed the squatting task (T2). Bars
show mean percentage donation 6 one standard error. The proportion
of endowment donated did not differ between treatments (F2,15=0.02,
p=0.977), however people receiving larger endowments donated a
smaller proportion to charity (F1,58=6.66; p=0.012).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027623.g001
Table 1. Analysis of variance for individual investment in a)
round 3 and b) rounds 4 and 5 of the public goods game.
a)
Source DF F p
condition 2 2.81 0.067
sex 1 8.44 0.005
game theory 1 8.00 0.006
condition x game theory 2 3.83 0.027
b)
Source DF F p
condition 2 1.58 0.211
sex 1 5.45 0.021
game theory 1 1.47 0.228
condition x game theory 2 3.93 0.022
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027623.t001
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human behaviour more generally. However, our results do suggest
that we should be aware that there are likely to be behavioural
differences between participant pools drawn from people cogni-
sant of game theory and people unaware of this field (see [58]).
Participants who had heard of game theory behaved differently
in the PGG from those who had not: this is not entirely surprising
[51], but its interaction with performance of a dull task is
interesting. Further experimental work could usefully test the
robustness of this effect and, if it stands up to more explicit
scrutiny, address it in more detail. We hypothesise that, among
participants who are familiar with game theory, the framing effects
of presenting them with ‘‘an economic game’’ induced strategic
behaviour. In our design, inter-group competition for an
additional payoff (shopping vouchers) went some way to aligning
individual and group interests and it is possible that people who
are familiar with game theory were more likely to focus on this
potential gain and play strategically, whereas people who were not
behaved more ‘‘emotionally’’ after performing the dull task. It is
interesting that the physical task did not have this effect and it is
possible that this instead was interpreted as a ‘‘team-building’’
exercise. We noticed that participants appeared to be focussed on
their own pipette tip boxes and not engaging with one another,
whereas they seemed much more communicative in the physical
task. In future it would be useful to ask participants explicitly about
their feelings towards the tasks and towards their team-mates while
performing tasks [52,59]. Further, we did not test the extent of our
participants’ knowledge of game theory. In any future work, a
more thorough assessment of how deeply participants understand
game theory would facilitate a better exploration of how
knowledge of game theory influences behaviour.
Other authors have reported [34] that different game structures
can lead to different levels of cooperation and earning seems to
have different effects in dictator and trust games [21,47]. It is
unclear why a) our two different tasks had divergent effects on
behaviour in our PGG and b) a comparable effect was not present
in the DG. While the framing [57] of actions in games has received
a lot of general attention (e.g. [60–65]), the differences in framing
and interpretation of different standard games would benefit from
empirical research (e.g. [66]). In our case, the explanation may
simply be that the PGG by nature is more complex than the DG,
requiring more organisation and a more structured environment
for participants. A separate but related issue is the extent to which
a participant’s ‘cultural baggage’ may affect their interpretation of
games and their behaviour in the lab [58,67]. In general, it is
essential to understand what people are thinking, what features of
the experimental environment they find salient and how they
perceive different games.
We have presented initial findings that behaviour in a PGG can
be affected by requiring participants to earn their endowment by
means of a dull task, provided that those participants are
unfamiliar with game theory. Further exploration of how the
model tasks we employed affect economic/cooperative behaviour
could prove very useful for future experimental work. For
example, it would be interesting to test how people perceive co-
players in games with and without tasks (see [52]). More
importantly, we recommend a more thorough exploration of the
effects of these tasks on behaviour in a larger study population –
perhaps a population that is expected to be naı ¨ve with regard to
game theory – and with different game structures.
Methods
1. Ethics statement
This study was designed in accordance with the ethical
guidelines provided by the University of Oxford and the British
Psychological Society and received ethical approval from the
University of Oxford’s Social Sciences and Humanities Interde-
partmental Research Ethics Committee (reference: SSD/
CUREC1/10-284). Participants were recruited from students
and staff at the University of Oxford – mainly those working or
attending lectures in the Department of Zoology, though a
minority of participants were recruited by snowball sampling. All
participants provided written informed consent. Participants were
advised that part of the experiment (T2 condition, see below) was
not suitable for people with back or knee problems; any
participants who said this would not be suitable for them were
assigned to another condition. Information supplied to participants
and questionnaires used are provided as Supporting Information
S1.
2. Task validation and dictator games
90 participants (44 female) took part in this experiment, which
was framed as ‘‘a study of people’s feelings about money and
giving to charity.’’ Participant age ranged from 18 to 45 years
(mean 21.960.54 years). Participants were randomly assigned into
groups of 5 and each group randomly assigned to one of three
treatment conditions: Money (M); Task 1 (T1); or Task 2 (T2). 30
Figure 3. Investment in the public goods game. a) In round 3,
investment levels were constant across the three conditions among
participants who had heard of game theory, but varied across
conditions among participants who had not heard of game theory
(F1,65=3.83, p=0.027). All pairwise comparisons of conditions among
participants who had heard of game theory were non-significant
(p.0.6). b) Average investment in round 4 and 5. Investment did not
differ between M, T1 and T2 conditions among participants who were
unfamilar with game theory, nor between participants who were
familiar with game theory (p.0.3). Bars show mean 6 standard error;
black bars show M condition, grey bars T1 and white bars T2. p-values
for pairwise comparisons are from Tukey post-hoc tests.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027623.g003
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group member was randomly assigned £2, £4, £6, £8 or £10. In
the T1 condition, each group member was given four empty
pipette tip boxes (each designed to hold 96 200ml pipette tips) and
asked to fill them with tips as fast as possible; the fastest person was
assigned £10, the next £8, and so on down to the slowest person
who received £2. In the T2 condition, participants were asked to
squat in an isometric ski training position for as long as they could.
The group member who squatted the longest received £10, the
second longest £8 and so on. Each group of five performed their
task simultaneously, i.e. there was no privacy within groups.
Groups were, however, separated from one another; groups tested
at the same time were separated by screens. Participants received
their endowment in a numbered money bag. The endowment was
supplied divided into tenths (achieved by using appropriate
denominations and/or taping coins together).
Median age did not vary across treatments (Kruskal Wallis Test:
H=4.27, D.F. =2, p=0.118, n=89 as one participant did not give
their age). The proportion of females did not vary across treatments
(x
2
2=3.29, p=0.193, n=88). 64 participants said that they had
previously heard of game theory: males were more likely to have
heard of game theory than females (x
2
1=6.07, p=0.014, n=81),
but overall the proportion of participants who had heard of game
theory did not vary across treatments (x
2
2=77, p=0.682, n=83).
After receiving their endowment, participants answered a short
questionnaire asking about demographic information and their
feelings about the endowment. Specifically, they were asked
whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: ‘‘I
earned the money I was given’’; ‘‘the money I was given belonged
to me’’; ‘‘the task I did was dull’’ and ‘‘the task I did was difficult’’.
Participants were instructed to go behind a screen, remove as
much of the endowment (in tenths) as they wanted to keep, re-seal
the bag and place it in a donation box. Amounts donated were
linked to unique participant numbers, maintaining anonymity.
Participants were informed that all donations went to Oxfam
(http://www.oxfam.org.uk; this charity has long been a household
name in the United Kingdom and has no political or religious
affiliation). The charity’s logo was used on posters in the
experimental area to reassure participants that money would
really be donated. A total of £337.80 was donated to Oxfam by
participants in this experiment.
We used general linear mixed models (GLMM) to determine
whether the proportion of the endowment donated was affected by
treatment, sex, age, knowledge of game theory or endowment size,
including group as a random factor. The results given are for
analyses that exclude nine participants who did not state their sex
and/or knowledge of game theory; including these participants did
not change the results. Proportion of endowment donated was
logit transformed to meet the assumptions of homoscedasticity and
normality of error.
3. Public goods games
72 participants (37 female) took part in this experiment.
Participant age ranged from 18 to 40 (mean 22.260.44 years).
39 participants said that they had previously heard of game theory
and the frequency of participants who had heard of game theory
was not different for females and males (x
2
1=0.93, p=0.33).
Because significant written information was provided on game
structure and payoffs, we verified that all participants spoke fluent
English. Before commencing the experiment, participants were
given a table showing examples of possible team investment
patterns and payoffs and asked to verify that they understood the
game; participants were given the opportunity to ask questions
before the game began to ensure their understanding.
Participants were randomly assigned into 24 teams of three
people and each team assigned to either the money (M) or task
(T1, T2) conditions. 2-3 teams played the game in each
experimental session and individuals were randomly assigned to
teams, i.e. they did not know which of the other people in the
room were in their team. Teams remained fixed over the course of
the game. In the M condition, participants played five rounds of a
simple public goods game: in each round, each participant
received an endowment of £1, a fraction of which (0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6,
0.8 or 1) they could contribute to a team investment. Participants
kept any money they did not invest. In the T1 condition, rounds 1,
2, 4 and 5 of the game were identical to the M game, but in round
3, participants were given four empty pipette tip boxes and told
that they would earn that round’s endowment in return for filling
the boxes with tips. The T2 condition was identical to the T1
condition except that participants earned their endowment in
round 3 by squatting in an isometric ski training exercise for 45
seconds. In T1 and T2, all participants completed the task. In each
round, the total invested by a team was multiplied by 1.5 and
divided equally between the team members. Participants were told
that the number of rounds in the game, and the instance of the
labour round, would be determined randomly. This was to remove
the risk of a ‘‘last round’’ effect and/or of participants using
backward induction to determine the best investment strategy
[54]. Participants were told their individual payoff after each
round and their total payoff at the end of the game.
Because we wanted to compare levels of cooperation between
our treatment groups, we chose to impose a game structure that,
on the whole, favoured cooperation. Otherwise, differences
between conditions may have been obscured by a general decay
of cooperation towards a selfish optimum regardless of condition.
Inter-group competition goes some way to aligning individuals’
selfish interests with those of the group, favouring cooperation on
both evolutionary [1] and behavioural [26,27,52] timescales. We
therefore imposed inter-group competition by awarding vouchers
for a major online retailer for the three groups which gained the
highest total earnings across all five rounds of the game and across
all conditions.
Data on per-round individual and team investment were
analysed using GLMM. Participant was declared as a random
factor nested in team, which was itself a random factor nested in
condition. Round was coded as categorical variable to allow for
post-hoc pairwise comparisons between rounds and/or groups.
When all rounds in the M condition were analysed together,
individual investment was square root transformed to meet model
assumptions.
Supporting Information
Supporting Information S1 Information and instructions
provided to participants in the DG and PGG.
(DOC)
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